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The growing influence of utilitarianism and legal positivism in Amer-
ican jurisprudence today and the decline of natural law have produced an
ominous shift in the foundation of our legal system. This shift is illus-
trated by various courts' approaches to momentous legal issues of the
Twentieth Century such as abortion and euthanasia. Ultimately, legal
positivism is unacceptable as a jurisprudential framework because it pro-
vides no inherent limits on the power of the state and no basis for deter-
mining what is just. In contrast, the natural law provides a
jurisprudential framework that both guides and limits the civil law. It
therefore is both a practical and a necessary alternative to legal
positivism.
I. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND THE LAW
Although very few law schools require the subject, those of us who
teach jurisprudence may be forgiven for regarding it as the most impor-
tant course in the curriculum. While formal study of it is not widely re-
quired, American law schools do teach a philosophy of law. Though
usually implicit, that philosophy pervades the curriculum and competent
observers have long voiced concern about its effect on the legal profes-
sion. More than a decade ago, Dean Roger C. Cramton described "the
ordinary religion of the law school classroom," as "a moral relativism
tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral instru-
mentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism, an individualism tending
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. B.A. College of the Holy
Cross, 1953; J.D. Boston College Law School; L.L.M. and J.S.D. New York University.
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toward atomism, and a faith in reason and democratic processes tending
toward mere credulity and idolatry."1
"Law teachers and law students of 1984," said Professor Harold
Berman in a regrettably unnoticed address, "are more one sided, and
more mistaken, in their view of the nature of law than were their prede-
cessors in any other period of American history."2 Professor Berman's ex-
planation of the root of the crisis is worth extended quotation:
In American law schools today, reference is rarely made to the
sources of our legal tradition in the religious convictions of our ances-
tors, both Jewish and Christian. It is simply not mentioned that, histor-
ically, all the legal systems of the West emerged in response to a belief
in the lawful character of the universe and in the fundamental purpose
of law to guide men and women to salvation ....
Admittedly, these historical truths, which are not taught today,
were also not generally taught in American law schools one hundred or
one hundred and fifty years ago. But then they were taught in the
homes and in the churches. They were taken for granted. They were
part of the public philosophy. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth and
into the first decades of the twentieth century American lawyers
learned their law chiefly from Blackstone, who wrote that "[T]he law of
nature. . . dictated by God himself. . . is binding. . . in all countries
and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this;
and such of them as are valid derive all force and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original."
Only in the past two generations, in my lifetime, has the public
philosophy of America shifted radically from a religious to a secular
theory of law, from a moral to a political or instrumental theory, and
from a historical to a pragmatic theory . . . .Rarely does one hear it
said that law is a reflection of an objective justice or of the ultimate
meaning or purpose of life. Usually it is thought to reflect at best the
community sense of what is expedient; and more commonly it is
thought to express the more or less arbitrary will of the lawmaker ....
The triumph of the positivist theory of law-that law is the will of
the lawmaker-and the decline of rival theories-the moral theory that
law is reason and conscience, and the historical theory that law is an
ongoing tradition in which both politics and morality play important
parts-have contributed to the bewilderment of legal education. Skep-
ticism and relativism are widespread ....
' * .The traditional Western beliefs in the structural integrity of
law, its ongoingness, its religious roots, its transcendent qualities, are
disappearing not only from the minds of law teachers and law students
but also from the consciousness of the vast majority of citizens, the peo-
ple as a whole; and more than that, they are disappearing from the law
itself. The law itself is becoming more fragmented, more subjective,
geared more to expediency and less to morality, concerned more with
immediate consequences and less with consistency or continuity. The
1. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL ED. 247,
262-63 (1978).
2. Berman, The Crisis of Legal Education in America, 26 B.C.L. REv. 347, 348 (1985).
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historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away in the
twentieth century, and the tradition itself is threatened with col-
lapse ...
It may be impossible to restore the ancient Judaic and Christian
foundations of our legal tradition. But it is important, first, to recognize
that it is the disappearance of those religious foundations that gives
power to the convictions of the utopian nihilists-power possibly to
overcome the superficial utilitarianism of the liberal establish-
ment....
* * ' We shall not achieve social justice without a strong sense of
legality, and we shall not recover a strong sense of legality without an
integrative jurisprudence that finds the sources of our law not only in
politics, but also in history, in human nature, and in the universe
itself.3
Dean Cramton and Professor Berman are quoted here, not to imply
their support for the positions taken in this essay on issues they did not
address, but rather because they described well the utilitarian, positivistic
philosophy that dominates the American legal profession. "[P]erhaps the
most consistent expression of analytical positivism in legal theory" is
Hans Kelsen's "pure theory of law."'4 Legal positivism "contemplates the
form of law rather than its moral or social contents, . . . it confines itself
to the investigation of the law as it is, without regard to its justness or
unjustness, and . . . it attempts to free legal theory completely from all
qualification or value judgments of a political, social, or economic na-
ture."5 Legal positivism offers no rationale for arguing that a law can be
void for injustice rather than merely unwise or unconstitutional.
"[J]ustice," according to Kelsen, "is not ascertainable by rational knowl-
edge at all . . . . From the standpoint of rational knowledge there are
only interests and conflicts of interests . . . . Justice is an irrational
ideal."' According to Kelsen, "law is . . . a system of coercion-imposing
norms which are laid down by human acts in accordance with a constitu-
tion, the validity of which is presupposed, if it is on the whole efficacious.
'Constitution' in this definition means a norm (or plurality of norms) laid
down by human acts which regulate the method of creation of other
norms."7 Kelsen acknowledged that with respect to:
[T]he norms of morals . . . all the individual norms can be derived
from the basic norm by an operation of thought, namely, by deduction
from universal to particular. With legal norms the case is different.
These are not valid by virtue of their content. Any content whatsoever
can be legal; there is no human behavior which could not function as
the content of a legal norm. A norm becomes a legal norm only because
3. Id. at 348-52 (emphasis in original).
4. E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 285 (1940).
5. Id. See also, J. Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 42 (1955).
6. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 474, 482 (1934).
7. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS REASONINGS 106 n.34 (1964) (quoting Kelsen,
Was ist ein Rechstakt); See also Clark, Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, 22 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 170, 172 (1969).
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it has been constituted in a particular fashion born of a definite proce-
dure and a definite rule. . . .The individual norms of the legal system
are not to be derived from the basic norm by a process of logical deduc-
tion. They must be constituted by an act of will, not derived by an act
of thought.'
A. Abortion: A Case Study in the Application of Legal Positivism in
the Law
A clear application of positivist theory in American law is Byrn v.
New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,9 where the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the permissive 1970 New York abortion law. The court
first found as a fact that the unborn child is a living human being upon
conception: "It is human. . . and it is unquestionably alive."' 0 The court
went on to rule that the unborn human being could legitimately be de-
fined as a nonperson by the legislature. Significantly, the court relied on
Hans Kelsen as authority for its position:
What is a legal person is for the law, including, of course, the Constitu-
tion, to say, which simply means that upon according legal personality
to a thing the law affords it the rights and privileges of a legal person
(e.g., Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 93-109...).11
In its 1973 abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 2 the Supreme Court took
the same approach, ruling that, whether or not the unborn child is a
human being, he is not a person for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 1 3 The legal debate generated by Roe has treated as irrelevant the
question of whether or not the fetus is a human being. 4 Instead, the
Court has simply side-stepped the issue by declaring that a fetus is not a
person. The proponents of abortion can deny but they cannot disprove
8. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 51 L. Q. REv. 517, 517-18 (1934) (a continuation
of Kelsen, supra note 6). Kelsen also wrote: "Therefore any kind of content might be law
.... The validity of a legal norm may not be denied for being (in its content) in conflict
with that of another norm which does not belong to the legal order whose basic norm is the
reason for the validity of the norm in question." H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 198 (M.
Knight trans. 1967).
9. 31 N.Y. 2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
10. Byrn, 31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888.
11. Id. at 202, 286 N.E.2d at 889.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. The Court continues to follow at least this aspect of its Roe holding: "No member
of this Court has ever questioned the holding in Roe .... that a fetus is not a 'person'
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3083 n.13 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
14. On the beginning of human life at conception, i.e., fertilization, see The Human
Life Bill, 1981: Hearings on S. 158 before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st sess. 7-23 (1981) (testimony of Dr. Jerome
Lejeune, Professor of Fundamental Genetics, University of Rene Descartes, Paris, France);
W. HAMILTON and H. MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 14 (4th ed. 1972); L. AREY, DEVELOP-
MENTAL ANATOMY 55 (7th ed. 1974); K. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORI-
ENTED EMBRYOLOGY 1 (2d ed. 1977).
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that the unborn child is a human being at every stage of development
and, if they doubt that it is so, they are unwilling to give the benefit of
that doubt to life rather than to death.
B. Selective Reduction: A Further Ethical Dilemma From the Positivist
Approach
One striking recent disclosure demonstrates the sham character of
the denial of life by proponents of abortion. It also illustrates the degrad-
ing tendency of a legal philosophy which reduces law to an exercise of
will, utilitarian and indifferent to the content of the norm it imposes.
That disclosure is the confirmation that selective abortion of multiple
children in the womb has become accepted medical practice. The lack of
legal controversy generated by this tells as much about the legal profes-
sion as the practice itself does about the medical. In the New England
Journal of Medicine, six physicians last year published a study entitled,
"Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies in the First Trimester."' 5
They stated the problem that gave rise to this technique and tabulated
the results:
The number of pregnancies complicated by multiple gestation has been
increasing as a result of the relatively widespread use of ovulatory
drugs and in vitro fertilization. In pregnancies with multiple gestations,
adverse outcome is directly proportional to the number of fetuses
within the uterus, primarily because of an increased predisposition to
premature delivery .... One option these patients may consider is se-
lective reduction to a smaller number of fetuses in an attempt to in-
crease their chances of delivering infants mature enough to survive
without being irreversibly damaged by the sequelae of marked
prematurity.
We report our experience with 11 patients who had a total of 12
multifetal pregnancies. Two of the patients had each conceived six fe-
tuses, one had five, five had four, and four were carrying triplets. The
number of fetuses was reduced to two in 11 pregnancies, and three in 1
pregnancy. All the procedures were performed between weeks 9 and 13
of gestation. Three procedures were done by transcervical aspiration of
one or more sacs, and the remaining nine were accomplished by trans-
abdominal intrathoracic injection of potassium chloride. Seven of the
patients have had healthy twins, one has had a healthy single infant,
and four had no liveborn infants."6
The authors described the technique in terms that leave no doubt
that what is involved is the intentional and direct killing of a human
being:
When the procedure was performed transabdominally, .. a linear-ar-
ray ultrasound transducer in a sterile sheath was used to establish the
15. Berkowitz, Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies in the First Trimester,
318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1043 (1988).
16. Id. at 1043.
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relation of all the sacs to each other. Under direct ultrasonic visualiza-
tion, with the transducer held by the operator, a 20-gauge needle was
introduced into the thorax of one of the upper-most fetuses. Whenever
possible, the needle tip was placed directly into the fetal heart. Two to
7 mmol of potassium chloride was then injected, and the fetal heart was
monitored visually for asystole. If cardiac activity persisted, 5 to 10 ml
of sterile saline was injected next to the heart in an attempt to disrupt
cardiac function by extrinsic pressure. After asystole had been observed
for 60 seconds, the needle was removed. The procedure was then re-
peated in one or more additional fetuses if necessary. Each insertion of
a needle through the maternal skin was performed with a new needle.
The only criterion for the selection of a fetus was its proximity to the
patient's abdominal wall, and the os immediately adjacent to the inter-
nal os was automatically excluded. . . .Before being discharged, each
patient underwent a second scanning; if cardiac activity was observed
in a fetus that had been subjected to a termination procedure, the pa-
tient was scheduled to undergo the procedure again one week later. 17
The dead child is absorbed by the mother's body. The authors conclude
that "a good time to perform first-trimester reduction procedures is be-
tween the 11th and 12th weeks of gestation."' 8 They advise against delay-
ing the procedure beyond the 12th week. One reason is that "the longer a
patient waits to undergo a selective reduction, the greater may be the
psychological difficulty of making the decision. Candidates for the proce-
dure invariably undergo multiple ultrasound examinations that provide
visual contact with their fetuses; this can evoke the type of emotional
bonding that normally begins to develop after birth."'9 If the injection
does not kill the targeted baby on the first try, the procedure is repeated.
"We arbitrarily chose to wait one week before repeating the procedure in
any patient, and were successful on each of the three occasions when that
was necessary in this series. It is obviously necessary to map the location
of each sac carefully at the time of the procedure so it will be possible to
identify a specific fetus later.' 20 A New England Journal of Medicine edi-
torial endorsed the procedure in an analysis that epitomizes the applica-
tion of utilitarianism to issues of life and death:
The ethical ramifications of selective-reduction procedures are cer-
tainly complicated. Those with the view that abortion under any cir-
cumstances is wrong will find selective reduction ethically unacceptable.
Those who think that abortion may be appropriate under special cir-
cumstances must wrestle with the concept of sacrificing some fetuses so
that others can survive.
The legal aspects of selective reduction are not complicated. A wo-
man who wishes to interrupt her pregnancy before the fetus or fetuses
are viable can now do so, whatever her reasons. This procedure simply
17. Id. at 1044.
18. Id. at 1045.
19. Id. at 1046.
20. Id. at 1046.
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represents a variation of first-trimester termination of pregnancy."
Hard cases make bad law. The woman who is pregnant with six un-
born children, none of whom will likely survive unless some are killed by
"reduction," is deserving of sympathy as well as support. Nevertheless, it
does not follow that she ought to have the right to kill any of her chil-
dren.22 The utilitarian approach, of course, imposes no real barrier to
such killing. "Dr. John C. Fletcher, an ethicist at the University of Vir-
ginia who is an Episcopal priest, finds pregnancy reductions of triplets or
more to be acceptable. He said that since even pregnancies involving trip-
lets frequently results [sic] in babies that are premature and have serious
medical problems, reducing them to twins satisfies the ethical principle of
least harm for the most potential good."'2' No one familiar with the devel-
opment of legalized abortion from hard-cases-only to abortion on request
can reasonably expect that the selective reduction procedure will be lim-
ited to hard cases. Dr. Ronald Wapner of Jefferson Medical College in
Philadelphia acknowledged that "he had reduced a pair of healthy twins
to one 'at the patient's request.' "24 And "Dr. Schulman, the director of
the Virginia Genetics Institute, who has not been asked to perform the
procedure, said he would do any reduction that a patient wanted. 'Basi-
cally, my view is that it's the patient's choice,' he said. 'As a physician, I
don't see that it is my responsibility to say it's O.K. to reduce triplets to
twins but not twins to singletons, especially because if I were doing abor-
tions, I'd be reducing singletons to nothing.' )25
While "selective reduction" has generated some ethical debate,
26
there has been no significant legal debate because the legality of the pro-
cedure in all cases is regarded as settled by Roe v. Wade and its progeny.
The acceptance of "selective reduction" confirms the jurisprudential bot-
tom line. When the physician describes how the "20-gauge needle" by-
passes one child to seek the heart of his brother or sister, it is time to
close the debate and to admit that the event is an execution. If the law
authorizing that execution of the innocent is a valid law, then it should be
acknowledged that a law of absolutely any content could be a valid law in
the United States. Its proponents would justify "selective reduction" as a
remedy for hard cases. However, such justifications offer false security:
21. Hobbins, Selective Reduction-A Perinatal Necessity?, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1062, 1063 (1988).
22. "The authors (of the 'selective reduction' article) conclude that 'in any society in
which abortion is available on demand, the selective reduction procedure requires no addi-
tional rationale.' Sad but true. The logic of the physician as killer as well as healer is diffi-
cult to restrict, as Hippocrates warned us 2500 years ago. The only way for medicine to
recapture its soul, as a group of bioethicists recently warned, is 'to repudiate any and all acts
of direct killing by physicians."' Eugene F. Diamond, M.D., Letter, 319 Naw ENG. J. MED.
950 (1988).
23. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at Al, col. 6; see also, American Medical News, March
11, 1988.
24. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
25. Id.
26. See Letters in 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 949 (1988).
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The prevailing jurisprudence offers no basis whatever for restricting the
practice to hard cases. The intentional, direct killing of innocent human
beings ought never to be justified. But the "selective reduction" develop-
ment illustrates beyond the possibility of dispute that positivist jurispru-
dence is so paralyzed that it cannot stop short of sanctioning obvious
discretionary execution. This was already the lesson of Roe. Now, "selec-
tive reduction" forecloses any pretense of debate on the point. The recent
decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,27 merely indicates
that the Supreme Court may look favorably on some unspecified legisla-
tive restrictions on abortion. In light of the apparently unanimous accept-
ance by the Court of the non-personhood of the unborn child, Webster
provides no constitutional defense against "selective reduction" or any
other kind of abortion.28
Roe v. Wade, of course, established the right to procure and to per-
form the intentional, direct killing of innocents as a constitutional right.
The essential holding in Roe is that the unborn child is not a person for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The Court conceded that if the
unborn child is a person in terms of the fourteenth amendment, the case
for abortion "collapses." 9 The Court indicated in a note that, if the un-
born child is a person, the state could not allow abortion even to save the
life of the mother.30 The Court ruled, however, that whether or not the
unborn child is a human being, "the word 'person,' as used in the four-
teenth amendment, does not include the unborn. 3 1 The effect of the rul-
ing, therefore, is the same as would be an explicit decision that an
acknowledged human being is a non-person. If you are a person, that does
not mean that you have every constitutional right. A person younger than
35 years does not have the right to be elected and serve as President. But,
if you are not a person, you do not have any constitutional rights, includ-
ing the right to live. A states' rights position on abortion is premised on
the non-personhood of the unborn child; if an innocent person is subject
to execution whenever the legislature authorizes it, he is, in that most
important respect, a non-person. As Justice Stevens observed in Webster,
"[e]ven the dissenters in Roe implicitly endorsed [the holding in Roe that
'a fetus is not a person'] by arguing that state legislatures should decide
whether to prohibit or to authorize abortions. . . .By characterizing the
basic question as 'a political issue' (in Webster), Justice Scalia likewise
implicitly accepts this holding.''32
27. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
28. Id. at 3083 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
30. Roe, 410 U.S. 157-58 n.54.
31. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
32. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3083 n.13. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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C. Euthanasia: the Utilitarian Ethic and the Social Acceptability of
Killing
Of course, if the unborn child can be defined as a non-person so as to
allow his execution at the discretion of others, so can his elder brother or
his grandmother. Not surprisingly, the extension of this principle is al-
ready far advanced. Case law has established the right of the physician
and family members to withhold or withdraw artificially supplied nutri-
tion and hydration from an incompetent patient even where that patient
has not requested such and even where the patient is "awake and con-
scious."'33 The Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association has approved the withdrawal of artificially supplied
nutrition and hydration from comatose or vegetative patients who are not
terminally ill:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy
of the diagnosis, and with the concurrence of those who have responsi-
bility for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all
means of life-prolonging medical treatment.
Life-prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artifi-
cially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition, or hydration. In
treating a terminally-iUl or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician
should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its bur-
dens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained .3
In Matter of Conroy,35 the court said:
In the absence of trustworthy evidence, or indeed any evidence at all,
that the patient would have declined the treatment, life-sustaining
treatment may still be withheld or withdrawn from a formerly compe-
tent person like Claire Conroy if a third, pure-objective test, is satisfied.
Under that test, as under the limited-objective test, the net burdens of
the patient's life with the treatment should clearly and markedly out-
weigh the benefits that the patient derives from life.
Claire Conroy was "awake and conscious" but was expected to die within
a year. In the case of In re Peter,36 however, the New Jersey court said
"the one-year life-expectancy test and the limited-objective and objective
tests set forth in Conroy' 37 would be limited to "'elderly, formerly com-
petent patients' like Claire Conroy 'who. . .are awake and conscious and
33. Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Gray v. Romeo, 709 F. Supp.
325 (D.R.I. 1989) (upholding such termination as a civil right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); but see
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3859
(U.S. July 3, 1989); Westchester County Medical Center v. Hall, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d
607 (1988).
34. Text of Opinion on Withholding Treatment, American Medical News, Mar. 28,
1986, at 1.
35. 98 N.J. 321, 366, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
36. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
37. Id. at 374, 529 A.2d at 424.
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can interact with their environment to a limited extent.' "38 The Peter
court authorized the withdrawal of life-support, including nutrition and
hydration, from "persistently vegetative" patients even if they have an
indefinite life expectancy. "For this kind of patient, our 'focal point...
should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to cogni-
tive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of...
biological vegetative existence.' "3
Significantly, the Conroy court not only rejected the distinction "be-
tween the termination of artificial feedings and the termination of other
forms of life-sustaining medical treatment,"4 but also said that "we re-
ject the distinction that some have made between actively hastening
death by terminating treatment and passively allowing a person to die of
disease as one of limited use in a legal analysis regarding such a decision-
making situation. . . .[T]he line between active and passive contuct in
the context of medical decisions is far too nebulous to constitute a princi-
pled basis for decisionmaking."1
Since the law has begun to authorize passive withholding of nutrition
and hydration, i.e., starving and dehydrating a patient to death, it re-
quires no great prescience to see that the next step will be active killing
on the request of the victim or for his own good if he is incompetent. This
outcome was foreshadowed in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital,2
where the court approved the withdrawal of a feeding tube from a patient
in a persistent vegetative state. "The withdrawal of the provision of food
and water," said Justice Lynch in dissent, "results in particularly diffi-
cult, painful and gruesome death; the cause of death would not be some
underlying physical disability like kidney failure or the withdrawal of
some highly invasive medical treatment, but the unnatural cessation of
feeding and hydration which, like breathing, are part of the responsibili-
ties we assume toward our bodies routinely. Such a process would not be
very far from euthanasia, and the natural question is: 'Why not use more
humane methods of euthanasia if that is what we indorse?' "4
Sixteen states provide convicted murderers a relatively painless exe-
cution by injection." There seems little doubt that the same benefit will
be extended to those whose death is already authorized by "passive" star-
vation and dehydration. One indication of this progression is the quiet
legitimization of assisted suicide for AIDS victims:
Brian Smith supervises 60 volunteers at the San Francisco chapter of
Shanty, which provides counseling to help AIDS patients deal with
their grief. When patients want to talk about suicide, "and most do," he
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id.
40. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372, 486 A.2d at 1235.
41. Id. at 369-70, 486 A.2d at 1233-34.
42. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
43. Id. at 444, 497 N.E.2d at 641 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
44. AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH
PENALTY Appendix 1 (1987).
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said volunteers suggest that patients talk with their doctors. "Most doc-
tors will recite the Hippocratic oath," he said. "Then they will look
their patient in the eye and say, 'If you get really sick, I will provide the
means necessary to stop the pain.' That's understood code around here.
Everybody knows that enough morphine will kill you."4B
The AIDS epidemic, according to Dr. Robert McAfee, a trustee of the
American Medical Association, has "brought about a more frequent and
open debate among physicians" as to the ethics of helping patients com-
mit suicide.4 One rationale for the role of the physician as minister of
death was voiced by Dr. Earl E. Shelp, a Southern Baptist minister from
Houston who teaches a seminar on AIDS and a course on medical ethics
at Dartmouth College: "This notion that a physician's obligation to pa-
tients only and always involves prolonging their lives is to misunderstand
the richness of the therapeutic relationship. Medicine is also about the
dignity of death. Ultimately all of us are going to die."' 7
It would be unrealistic to expect physician-assisted suicide to be the
terminal point of the movement toward euthanasia. 8 As long ago as 1970,
California Medicine, the journal of the California Medical Association,
editorially described "A New Ethic for Medicine and Society":
It will become necessary and acceptable to place relative rather
than absolute values on such things as human lives, the use of scarce
resources and the various elements which are to make up the quality of
life or of living which is to be sought. This is quite distinctly at variance
with the Judeo-Christian ethic and carries serious philosophical, social,
economic and political implications for Western society and perhaps for
world society.
The process of eroding the old ethic and substituting the new has
already begun. It may be seen most clearly in changing attitudes toward
human abortion. In defiance of the long held Western ethic of intrinsic
and equal value for every human life regardless of its stage, condition
or status, abortion is becoming accepted by society as moral, right and
even necessary. It is worth noting that this shift in public attitude has
affected the churches, the laws and public policy rather than the re-
verse. Since the old ethic has not yet been fully displaced it has been
necessary to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing,
which continues to be socially abhorrent. The result has been a curious
avoidance of the scientific fact, which everyone really knows, that
human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra- or
extra-uterine until death. The very considerable semantic gymnastics
which are required to rationalize abortion as anything but taking a
human life would be ludicrous if they were not often put forth under
socially impeccable auspices. It is suggested that this schizophrenic sort
45. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Doerflinger, Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life, in Mercy, Murder &
Morality: Perspectives on Euthanasia, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 16 (Special Supple-
ment, Jan.-Feb. 1989).
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of subterfuge is necessary because while a new ethic is being accepted
the old one has not yet been rejected."
The new ethic has progressed to the point where "killing" is no
longer "socially abhorrent." In utilitarian terms the killing of the un-
wanted or defective unborn, retarded children, vegetative or merely in-
competent elderly and some others makes sense. The persistently low
fertility and birth rates,50 the rising cost of medical and custodial care for
the elderly and the handicapped, 51 and the escalating cost of caring for
AIDS patients52 provide incentives for permitting the active killing of
some classes of patients. A first step would be to allow, for example, the
AIDS victim to choose to die, including an assisted death by injection or
other active means. If, however, he chooses to remain alive during the
natural course of the disease, that decision could be some evidence of le-
gal incompetence which would permit the decision to be made for him.
The dominant legal philosophy practically invites these results.5 3 The
denial of personhood, which is explicit in Roe v. Wade with respect to the
unborn child, is implicit in the allowance of starvation and dehydration of
the incompetent and the predictable legitimization of active euthanasia of
some target classes. If your life is subject to termination at the discretion
of another, you are, to that extent, a non-person. The Supreme Court
appeared to concede in Roe that, if the unborn child is a person the state
would be obliged to protect his life and the state could not allow abortion
even to save the life of the mother.54 As Justice Stevens stated in his
concurrence in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
49. Editorial, A New Ethic for Medicine and Society, 113 CAL. MED. 67, 67-68 (Sept.
1970).
50. See B. WATTENBERG. THE BIRTH DEARTH (1987); N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at 1, col.
6; Washington Times, June 10, 1987, at D4, col. 6.
51. See Koop, Mercy Murder and Morality: Perspectives on Euthanasia, 119 HAs-
TINGS CENTER REPORT, (Special Supplement Jan.-Feb. 1989); Wanzer, The Physician's Re-
sponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989); Wilkes &
Schuchman, What Is Too Old, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 4, 1989, at 58.
52, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1989, at 7, col. 5; Washington Times, Oct. 26, 1987, at Al, col.
3; Insight, Aug. 25, 1986, at 54.
53. "I see no reason," wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "for attributing to man a
significance different in kind from that which belongs to a baboon or a grain of sand."
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 252 (1918). Justice Benjamin Cardozo described
Holmes as "the great overlord of the law and its philosophy" and "for all students of the law
and for all students of human society the philosopher and seer, the greatest of our age in the
domain of jurisprudence, and one of the greatest of the ages." B. CARDOZO, MIL JUSTICE
HOLMES 20, 5 (F. Frankfurter ed. 1931). Holmes claimed that "the sacredness of human life
is a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force, miti-
gated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, and between two groups that
want to make inconsistent kinds of world I see no remedy except force." Holmes-Pollock
Letters, 2:36. But see Hoffheimer, Holmes, L.Q.C. Lamar, and Natural Law, 58 Miss. L.J.
71, 82-83 (1988), for an interesting analysis concluding that Holmes "rejected natural law
while retaining some of its chief features .... Holmes also expressed basic attitudes tradi-
tionally associated with transcendental natural law theory." See also, Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157-58 n.54.
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necologists,55 "unless the religious view that a fetus is a 'person' is
adopted ... there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference be-
tween a fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not such a difference,
the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left
to the will of the state legislatures."56 Personhood inherently includes a
right to the protection of the law, especially with respect to the right to
live.
D. Following in the Footsteps of the Holocaust
In its denial of personhood to innocent human beings and in its re-
nunciation of the duty of the law to protect innocent lives, the American
legal orthodoxy is following the model of the jurisprudence of Nazi Ger-
many. This analogy is not meant to minimize the status of the Holocaust
as a unique historical event. However, it would be unrealistic to ignore
the signs that we have introduced into our law and medical practice the
principles which underlay the Nazi exterminations. In his 1949 analysis of
the involvement of the German medical profession in the Nazi euthanasia
program, Dr. Leo Alexander wrote:
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evi-
dent to all who investigated them that they had started from small be-
ginnings. The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis
in the basic attitude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of
the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a
thing as life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early stages
concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradu-
ally the sphere of those to be included in this category was enlarged to
encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the
racially unwanted and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to
realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this entire
trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the
nonrehabilitable sick.
The question that this fact prompts is whether there are any dan-
ger signs that American physicians have also been infected with Hege-
lian, cold-blooded, utilitarian philosophy and whether early traces of it
can be detected in their medical thinking that may make them vulnera-
ble to departures of the type that occurred in Germany .... Physi-
cians have become dangerously close to being mere technicians of
rehabilitation. 7
Shortly before his death in 1984, Dr. Alexander commented with re-
spect to the American situation that "[iut is much like Germany in the
20's and 30's-the barriers against killing are being removed."58 The basic
principle of "selective reduction" of multiple fetuses and other forms of
55. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
56. Id. at 779 (Stevens, J. concurring).
57. Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 39, 44-45,
(1949).
58. Stanton, The New Untermenschen, HuM. LIFE REV. 1985 at 77, 82.
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legalized abortion is precisely the principle that underlay the Nazi de-
crees that deprived Jews of rights and ultimately subjected them to exter-
mination. It is the principle that an innocent human being can be
declared to be a non-person and subjected to execution at the discretion
of others. Under Roe v. Wade the unborn child, as a non-person, is as
legally defenseless as were the victims of Nazi exterminations. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services," indicates that state legislatures will be
allowed to provide some as yet unspecified protection of the unborn child,
but the child still has no constitutional protection if the legislature de-
cides to authorize his execution by abortion. One difference between the
two classes of victims is that the Jews, Poles, Gypsies and other Nazi
victims were killed directly by officials of the State. The unborn children
are killed usually by private persons who are enabled to act as execution-
ers by a decree of the State, i.e., Roe v. Wade, which withdrew from those
victims the protection of the law which otherwise would have prevented
their execution. The distinction is not significant, because in both cases it
was the action of the State which decreed that the members of the victim
classes would (in Nazi Germany) or could (in the United States) be killed.
Whether the end comes in a gas chamber or at the point of "a 20-gauge
needle," the essence of the act, an execution of an innocent, is identical.
Legalized abortion in the United States has already resulted in the
deaths of four times as many innocent people as were killed in the Holo-
caust. Legalized abortions in this country are usually estimated at about
1.3 to 1.5 million a year.60 This figure, however, does not include early
abortions caused by the intrauterine device and some so-called contracep-
tive pills. Such early abortions have been estimated at between 6.4 and
8.8 million each year in this country.6 1 They are effectively beyond the
reach of the law except for licensing restrictions on the abortifacients.
Every abortion, however, at whatever stage, kills a human being. Even if
we exclude early abortifacients from consideration, the differences be-
tween the victims of abortion and the victims of the Holocaust still relate
mainly to age, self-sufficiency and place of residence. Formerly, another
difference was that the victim of abortion was unseen and effectively un-
known. But ultrasound technology has changed that, as indicated above
in the reluctance of physicians to perform "selective reduction" proce-
dures after the 12th week of gestation because, "Candidates for the proce-
dure invariably undergo multiple ultrasound examinations that provide
visual contact with their fetuses; this can evoke the type of emotional
bonding that normally begins to develop after birth.682
The experience of this century shows that utilitarianism and legal
positivism offer no hope for a restoration of a principled respect for the
right to life or for any other rights. The reason for this inability is reli-
59. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
60. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989, 70-71;
Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1989, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
61. See J. KIPPLEY, BIRTH CONTROL AND CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP (1985).
62. Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 1046.
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gious and it is attributable largely to the acceptance of the philosophy of
the Enlightenment, which rejected not only the Church but also revealed
religion in general, the objective moral law and the capacity of the intel-
lect to know truth. Man himself became the autonomous arbiter of right
and wrong, that is, he made himself god.13 The law here is a reflection of
society. Francis Canavan, S.J., described "the present stage of Western
culture" as "the fag end of the Enlightenment."6 '
[A]s the autonomous individual of liberal theory lost his faith in divine
revelation and in the ability of reason to perceive a natural moral order,
he became an independent self, a subject of rights rather than of obli-
gations, and a sovereign will bound by no law to which he himself had
not consented. In the end, he became a bundle of appetites, because his
will, lacking any anchorage in a divinely-created moral order, was sub-
merged in and identified with his desires. That, too, is a kind of indi-
vidualism, but a different kind from the freedom of the sons of God,
65
In Germany, "the spirit of the Enlightenment .. .degenerated in
. . .the nineteenth century into a materialistic and thereby more coarse
way of thinking. As a result, legal thinkers lost the inner power even to
visualize the possibility of an archetypal and morally binding ideal of jus-
tice above the positive legal order. With all its deficiencies, the medieval
concept of order did at least assume as well as recognize as its logical
presupposition a higher form of justice, namely, the notion of a natural
and divine right. The late nineteenth century in its materialistic and vol-
untaristic tendencies, on the other hand, concurred with Rudolf von Jher-
ing that law is but the 'child of power.' According to this new positivistic
jurisprudence, the legislator, and he alone, creates the law. Everything
prior to legislative enactment is at best 'custom,' but never true law.
Thus, law and right became wholly identified, and bare 'legality' takes the
place of substantive justice as an ideal."86 Under the Weimar Republic
(1918-1933), "the greatest obstacle to the recognition of natural law was
the doctrine of positivism which equated right and might to begin with
and, hence, assigned to the legislator full discretion as to the detailed con-
tent or provisions of the law, to the point of injustice, indeed to the point
of complete, high-handed arbitrariness."6 "Positivism has," said Gustav
Radbruch, "disarmed the German jurists against law of an arbitrary and
criminal content."'
Perhaps the most important lesson taught by the German experience
is a an affirmative one: "the necessity of universal higher standards of
63. See H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 75-109 (1947).
64. Canavan, Commentary, CATHOLIC EYE, 2 (Dec. 10, 1987).
65. Canavan, Commentary, CATHOLIC EYE, 2 (Mar. 17, 1988).
66. Von Hippel, The Role of Natural Law in the Legal Decisions of the German Fed-
eral Republic, 4 NAT. L.F. 106, 107 (1959) (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 109.
68. Rommen, Natural Law in Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and of the
Constitutional Courts in Germany, 4 NAT. L.F. 1, 11 n.26 (1959) (citation omitted).
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objectively valid suprapositive principles for the lawmaker." 9 As
Heinrich Rommen noted:
From the middle of 1946 on, a revival of natural law thinking took hold
of the intellectual world, especially the jurists and the members of the
constituent assemblies of the Lander .... Naturally the 'system of
injustice' had produced conversions, as it were, to natural law much
earlier; but the Nazi authorities would not permit an open discussion.
At the same time, all attempts at passive and active resistance to the
regime were necessarily grounded on natural law ideas or on divine law,
for legal positivism as such could offer no foundation . . . It was a
favorable circumstance, too, that Protestant theologians-not so much
of course Karl Barth and his disciples, but those influenced by Emil
Brunner's Justice (1943) and his earlier Das Gebot und die
Ordnungen-had returned to natural law thinking because of the obvi-
ous substantive illegitimacy of Hitler's legality and his open paganism.
Thus ended the long estrangement of Protestant theology from natural
law. 0
Numerous German lawyers and courts explicitly resorted to the natu-
ral law in writings and judicial decisions after the war. Among the most
influential was Gustav Radbruch. A criminal lawyer, philosopher of law,
and minister of Justice during the Weimar Republic, Radbruch was one
of the best-known jurists in Germany. Dismissed and condemned to si-
lence by the Third Reich, he now came forward to deny positivism-a
conversion reminiscent of Paul on the road to Damascus-for he himself
had previously been among the defenders of positivist views-in these
terms:
For the soldier an order is an order; for the jurist, the law is the law.
But the soldier's duty to obey an order is at an end if he knows that the
order will result in a crime. But the jurist, since the last natural law
men in his profession died off a hundred years or so ago, has known no
such exception and no such excuse for the citizen's not submitting to
the law. The law is valid simply because it is the law; and it is law if it
has the power to assert itself under ordinary conditions. Such an atti-
tude towards the law and its validity [i.e., positivism] rendered both
lawyers and people impotent in the face of even the most capricious,
criminal, or cruel of laws. Ultimately, this view that only where there is
power is there law [Recht] is nothing but an affirmation that might
makes right [Recht]. [Actually] law [Recht] is the quest for justice ...
if certain laws [Gesetze] deliberately deny this quest for justice (for ex-
ample, by arbitrarily granting or denying men their human rights) they
are null and void; the people are not to obey them, and jurists must
find the courage to brand them unlawful [ihnen den Rechtscharakter
absprechen.
7 1
In response to the claim by physicians who had participated in "ex-
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
71. Von Hippel, supra note 66, at 110-11 (citation omitted).
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perimental killings" that their actions were sanctioned by the laws of the
Third Reich, an appellate court at Frankfurt declared:
Law must be defined as an ordinance or precept devised in the service
of justice [citing Radbruch]. Whenever the conflict between an enacted
law and true justice reaches unendurable proportions, the enacted law
must yield to justice, and be considered a "lawless law [unrichtiges
Recht]." An accused may not justify his conduct by appealing to an
existing law if this law offended against certain self-evident precepts of
the natural law.72
In another case, the defendant, a Nazi officer, had summarily shot a
soldier who was absent without leave. The defendant relied on the so-
called Katastrophen-order of Hitler empowering any member of the
armed forces to kill instantly any deserter. The court found the defend-
ant liable for the payment of tort damages to the victim's mother. The
court held that the Katastrophen-order had not been validly promul-
gated but then went on to say:
Even if the Katastrophen-order had been promulgated in due form
it could not have become law [Recht]. For the positive legislative act is
intrinsically limited. It loses all obligatory power if it violates the gen-
erally recognized principles of international law or the natural law
[Naturrecht], or if the contradiction between positive law and justice
reaches such an intolerable degree that the law, as unrichtiges Recht,
must give way to justice.7 3
II. NATURAL LAW AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LEGAL POSITIVISM
A. Some Ancient Views of Natural Law
The idea of a natural law, knowable to the intellect, which deter-
mines the validity of human law, is not only not a sectarian Catholic
teaching. It is not even a Christian invention. Aristotle observed that
"there is such a thing as Natural Justice as well as justice not ordained by
nature. 7 4 Marcus Tullius Cicero described "Law" as "the highest reason,
implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids
the opposite. ' 5 He said that "right is based, not upon men's opinions,
but upon Nature."7 6 And, "Socrates was right when he cursed, as he often
did, the man who first separated utility from Justice; for this separation,
he complained, is the source of all mischief."'7 Cicero continued: "But the
most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is
found in the customs or laws of nations . . . . But if the principles of
72. Von Hippel, supra note 66, at 111 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 SUDDEUTSCHE
JURISTEN ZErrsCHRiFT, 321 (1947)).
73. Rommen, supra note 68, at 11 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
74. ARIsToTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (T. Erwin ed. 1985).
75. M. CICERo, LAws, IN THE GREAT LEGAL PHnLosoPHERs 44 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
76. Id. at 45.
77. Id. at 46.
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Justice were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or
the decisions of judges, then Justice would sanction robbery and adultery
and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the votes or
decrees of the populace."78 According to Cicero:
[W]hat is right and true is also eternal, and does not begin or end with
written statutes .... From this point of view it can be readily under-
stood that those who formulated wicked and unjust statutes for na-
tions, thereby breaking their promises and agreements, put into effect
anything but "laws." It may thus be clear that in the very definition of
the term "law" there inheres the idea and principle of choosing what is
just and true .... Therefore Law is the distinction between things
just and unjust, made in agreement with that primal and most ancient
of all things, Nature; and in conformity to nature's standard are framed
those human laws which inflict punishment upon the wicked but de-
fend and protect the goody.
7
B. The Need For a Relationship of the Natural Law to a Moral Code
Although the natural law is not a sectarian dogma, it would be a mis-
take to regard natural law jurisprudence as merely one secular, philosoph-
ical theory among others. Reliance upon a higher law makes little sense if
one is unable to identify the lawgiver and the purpose of that law. Thus
Cicero identified "the true and primal Law" as "the right reason of su-
preme Jupiter."' 0 In the Christian view, natural law and God's law are
rightly and necessarily considered together. In Robin v. Hardaway,81 in
1772, George Mason argued before the General Court of Virginia, against
a slavery statute, that:
All acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice
are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as
void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; Whose authority can be
superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our
obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All
human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience
bound to disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of
Justice.2
Today, if he argued in such terms, George Mason might be laughed
out of court. At least he would hardly be confirmed by the Senate for
appointment to the federal bench. Neither would William Blackstone. 3
78. Id. at 48.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id.
81. 2 Va. (2 Jefferson) 109 (1772).
82. Id. at 115; see also Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural
Law Concepts, 2 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 258 (1960); C. MANION, KEY TO PEACE, 30 (1950);
Antieau, Natural Rights and the Founding Fathers-The Virginians, 17 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 43 (1960).
83. For further discussion, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, it should be clear, after nine decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, that a regime which denies the spiritual nature and eternal destiny
of man can offer no coherent security for rights, including the right to
live. If man is merely matter, with no destiny beyond the grave, there is
no intrinsic reason for any absolute limits on what society and the State
can do to him. The only intelligible basis for asserting absolute, inaliena-
ble rights against the State is that man is an immortal, spiritual creature,
with an eternal destiny, made in the image and likeness of God whose law
governs all. There are absolutes, which even the State and lawyers cannot
change. "Resourceful western legal scholars," said Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn,
have now introduced the term "legal realism." By legal realism, they
want to push aside any moral evaluation of affairs .... At the present
time it is widely accepted among lawyers that law is higher than moral-
ity-law is something which is worked out and developed, whereas mo-
rality is something inchoate and amorphous. That isn't the case. The
opposite is rather true! Morality is higher than law! While law is our
human attempt to embody in rules a part of that moral sphere which is
above us, we try to understand this morality, bring it down to earth and
present it in a form of laws. Sometimes we are more successful, some-
times less. Sometimes you actually have a caricature of morality, but
morality is always higher than law. This view must never be aban-
doned. We must accept it with heart and soul. It is almost a joke now in
the western world, in the 20th century, to use words like 'good' and
"evil." They have become almost old-fashioned concepts, but they are
very real and genuine concepts. These are concepts from a sphere which
is higher than us.8 '
C. Christianity and the Natural Law-Not Only a Catholic Concept
The law today, in the name of freedom, is liberated from any subor-
dination to a higher law, including especially a higher law of God. One
reason for rejection of the Christian view as enunciated by Mason, Black-
stone and others 5 is a misconception that the model for a Christian view
of the law is something like the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Hans
Kelsen, in criticizing "[p]hilosophical absolutism," the "metaphysical
view that there is an absolute reality, i.e., a reality that exists indepen-
dently of human knowledge"88 argued that "[tiolerance, minority rights,
freedom of speech, and freedom of thought, so characteristic of democ-
racy, have no place within a political system based on the belief in abso-
lute values. This belief irresistibly leads-and has always led-to a
situation in which the one who assumes to possess the secret of the abso-
lute good claims to have the right to impose his opinion as well as his will
84. Address by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, to AFL-CIO, June 30, 1975 (IMPRIMIS 1,8
(Sept. 1975)).
85. For discussion of their views, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
86. Kelsen, Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics, 42 AM. POL. SCL
REv. 906 (1948).
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upon the others who are in error. And to be in error is, according to this
view, to be wrong, and hence punishable. '87 St. Thomas Aquinas, how-
ever, argued that human law is framed "for the common good of all the
citizens." ' The purpose of human law "is to lead men to virtue, not sud-
denly, but gradually."8 The human law, according to Aquinas, should
promote virtue, but it should not require the observance of every virtue
and it should not forbid every vice; if it did, the law might be "despised"
and "greater evils" might result.90
Unfortunately, affirmation of the natural law as a part of the law of
God is perceived by some as a sectarian Catholic position. However, Pro-
fessor John T. McNeill of Union Theological Seminary, discussing the
views of Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli and Calvin concluded that,
There is no real discontinuity between the teaching of the Reformers
and that of their predecessors with respect to natural law. Not one of
the leaders of the Reformation assails the principle. Instead, with the
possible exception of Zwingli, they all on occasion express a quite un-
grudging respect for the moral law naturally implanted in the human
heart and seek to inculcate this attitude in their readers. Natural law is
not one of the issues on which they bring the Scholastics under criti-
cism. With safeguards of their primary doctrines but without conscious
resistance on their part, natural law enters into the framework of their
thought and is an assumption of their political and social teaching
.... For the Reformers, as for the Fathers, canonists, and Scholastics,
natural law stood affirmed on the pages of Scripture." 91
D. Thomas Aquinas' Explanation of the Natural Law
1. A model for both Christian and non-Christian
The most systematic exposition of the natural law in the context of
Christian belief is that of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Aquinas
wrote from the Catholic view. Nevertheless, as one Evangelical author
noted, "Aquinas' perspective on human law became a major component
of Christian tradition .... "92 In what is commonly called his Treatise
on Law,83 Aquinas used abundant Scriptural quotations to establish and
support his positions. On self-evident truths, "Aquinas' view is drawn di-
rectly from the apostle Paul. ' 94 While he emphasized the role of reason,
87. Id. at 913.
88. T. AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGICA [hereinafter S.T.] I, II, Q. 96, art. 1 (infra refer-
ences to the Summa Theologica are taken from ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA
(Benziger ed. 1947)).
89. Id. at art. 2.
90. Id.
91. McNeill, Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers, 27 J. OF RELIGION 168
(1946).
92. L. BUZZARD & P. CAMPBELL, HOLY DISOBEDIENCE 125 (1984).
93. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 90-97.
94. G. Amos, Defending the Declaration: How the Bible and Christianity Influenced
the Declaration of Independence 120 (Wolgemuth & Hyatt ed. 1989) (unpublished
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the revelational component is essential to St. Thomas' treatment of law.
His discussion of law is a comparatively brief part of the Summa Theo-
logica, which is essentially a work of theology. Indeed, the Treatise on
Law is only a part of Aquinas' formal treatment of law, since it is fol-
lowed by his discussion of the moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts of
the Old Testament. 5
Application of the natural law is not limited to those who accept
Catholic teaching. Christians generally tend to profess similar moral val-
ues. The natural law can also effectively serve those without Christian
moral values by providing an acceptable jurisprudential framework. The
natural law approach ought to be attractive to those who seek an answer
to unrestrained utilitarianism and positivism whether or not they accept
the theistic foundation posited by St. Thomas. To appreciate the signifi-
cance of Aquinas' treatment of human law, however, one must consider it
in context with his discussion of God, creation, the nature of man, re-
demption, etc., and in light of the Catholic tradition in which he wrote.
2. The Thomistic view of human reason and truth
Unlike empiricists, positivists and others, St. Thomas affirms that
the intellect can know the essences of material things presented to it by
the senses."6 As one commentator summarized:
Each person has his own intellect which has two functions: it abstracts
essences from sense-perceived individuals; this abstracted essence is
then intelligible; it is impressed on the passive intellect. On reflection
the passive intellect understands that one essence belongs to many in-
dividuals, forming a class which can again be further unified by still
more abstract ideas into wider classes. Abstraction terminates in the
idea of being which includes God, the only self-existent Being. "I am
who am."
3. The necessity of revelation
Through reason, we can know the truth. The universal skeptic, on
the other hand, claims that he is sure that he can never be sure of any-
thing. The empiricist claims that the only things we can know are those
that can be empirically verified, although that statement itself cannot be
empirically verified. St. Thomas, however, recognizes limitations on
human reason and acknowledges that unaided human reason is not
enough for salvation. In the very first question in the Summa Theologica,
St. Thomas asks "Whether, besides Philosophy, any further Doctrine is
Required?" He answers, Yes, in a passage important enough to quote in
manuscript).
95. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 98-105.
96. See F. WILHELMSEN, MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THOMIS-
TIC EPISTEMOLOGY (1988).
97. C. HAGERTY, THE PROBLEM OF EvIL 18 (1978).
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It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge
revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human rea-
son. Firstly, indeed because man is directed to God, as to an end that
surpasses the grasp of his reason: The eye hath not seen, 0 God, be-
sides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for
Thee (Isa. lxiv. 4). But the end must first be known by men who are to
direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for
the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason
should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards
those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it
was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation because
the truth about God such as reason could discover it, would only be
known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of
many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends
upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation
of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was nec-
essary that they be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was
therefore necessary that, besides the philosophical science built up by
reason there should be a sacred science learned through revelation. 8
4. The limitations of human reason
Obviously reason cannot of itself provide complete knowledge of
God; if it could we would ourselves be God. Nevertheless, Aquinas affirms
that through reason we are able to know that God exists and we can know
his attributes to some extent. Aquinas' five proofs for the existence of
God illustrate his use of reason in this respect.9 9 Through reason we can
98. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, Q.1, art. 1.
99. In addition to the proofs from motion, causation, perfection and design, Aquinas
advanced the proof from necessity or contingency:
that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible
for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence-which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but
there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every neces-
sary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible
to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we
cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own neces-
sity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their neces-
sity. This all men speak of as God.
T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, Q. 2, art. 3.
As aptly expressed in the film version of The Sound of Music, "Nothing comes from
nothing, nothing ever could." The point Aquinas makes with these proofs is that not only is
belief in God reasonable, it is unreasonable not to believe in God. One who denies the exis-
tence of God must be prepared to say that an endless chain of movers is possible without a
prime mover; that an infinite chain of causes is conceivable without an uncaused first cause;
that something can come from absolutely nothing; that there is no ultimate and absolute
standard of perfection; and that the marvelous workings of the human brain, for example,
could occur through blind chance without intelligent design.
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also know certain attributes or perfections of God, e.g., that he is one,
infinite, perfect, simple, eternal, personal, omnipresent, omniscient, om-
nipotent and all-perfect. 100 Through reason we can know that we are com-
posed of a body and a spiritual soul.10' The spiritual nature of the human
soul is seen in our ability to perform the spiritual functions of abstraction
and reflection. Since death is the breaking up of a being into its parts, the
spiritual soul, which has no parts, is immortal in its nature.12 We depend
on revelation to know the supernatural mysteries of the Trinity, creation,
and salvation.'
5. The natural law and human reason
The natural law, as explained by Aquinas, relates to the Christian
belief that God gives to each person sufficient grace to be saved, but that
each one has to make the same choice faced by Adam and Eve: to obey or
to disobey God. Just as the maker of an automobile has built into it a
certain nature and gives directions for its use so that it will achieve its
end, so God has given directions to man in revelation and the natural law.
Revelation includes the Old Testament and the New Testament, which
St. Thomas calls the divine law. In addition to the eternal law, which is
"the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the uni-
verse," 4 and the divine law of revelation, there is the natural law. Man,
a rational creature, "has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby [he] has
a natural inclination to [his] proper act and end: and this participation of
the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law."' 0 5 The
"light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is
evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an im-
print on us of the Divine Light. It is therefore evident that the natural
law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal
100. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, Q. 1-43.
101. Id. at Q. 75-89.
102. See P. BPisTow, THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, POSITION PAPER 182, 89-92
(1989). God, of course, could annihilate the soul and we rely on revelation for the assurance
that He will not.
103. See generally, T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, Q. 44-119. The fact that the Trinity is beyond
human power to understand does not mean that it is inconsistent with reason. God con-
ferred on the first human beings the supernatural gift of sharing in the life of the Trinity in
eternal happiness. All they had to do was to choose to love and obey God. But they dis-
obeyed. When they sinned, they lost that supernatural gift and did not have it to hand
down to us. They also lost their preternatural gifts of freedom from death, integrity, etc. We
come into the world, therefore, subject to death and suffering. We lack the integrity and
self-control that were given to Adam and Eve; instead we have concupiscence, an inclination
to evil. Most important, we come into this life without the supernatural gift of sanctifying
grace; we have no right to Heaven and no way to get there, except that Christ has restored
to us the opportunity to choose eternal happiness. In His mercy and love, God promised
man a second chance. God, the Second Person of the Trinity, took on human nature (the
Incarnation) so that he, as man, could make reparation for the sins of man and so that, as
God, his reparation would be sufficient satisfaction for the infinite offense against God.
104. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 91, art. 1.
105. Id. at art. 2.
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law."'106 The natural law is therefore a rule of reason, promulgated by God
in man's nature, whereby man can discern how he should act so as to
achieve his end of salvation.
6. Understanding the natural law-human inclinations deter-
mined by the nature of man
What are the commands of this natural law and how are they
known? We should first distinguish the speculative reason from the prac-
tical reason. The object of the speculative reason is being, while the ob-
ject of the practical reason is the good. The first principle of the
speculative reason is the principle of contradiction, that a thing cannot be
and not be at the same time under the same aspect. Or, "That the same
thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time."'' 0 This principle
is self-evident. It cannot be doubted by any rational person. A pen may
be a cylinder, black, four inches long, metal, etc. But in terms of its pen-
ness, either it is a pen or it is not a pen. It cannot be both. It cannot be
both a pen and a giraffe.
The first self-evident principle of the practical reason is that "good is
to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." 08 The good is that
which is in accord with the nature of the thing. Everything has a nature,
built into it by its manufacturer. Man is no different in this respect. The
essential nature of man is unalterable since it is a reflection of the unal-
terable divine essence. 09 According to St. Thomas, "all those things to
which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason
as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries
as evil, and objects of avoidance." ' 110 The basic inclinations of man are:
1. To seek the good, which is ultimately his highest good which is
eternal happiness.
2. To preserve himself in existence.
3. To preserve the species, that is, to unite sexually.
4. To live in community with other men.
5. To use his intellect and will, that is, to know the truth and to make
his own decisions."'
These inclinations are put into man's nature by God to help him at-
tain his final end of eternal happiness with God. Conclusions are drawn
from these inclinations by deduction: Good should be done; this action is
good; this action should be done. St. Thomas notes, however, that "be-
cause of concupiscence or some other passion. . . evil persuasions. . . or
106. Id.
107. Id. at Q 94, art. 2.
108. Id.
109. H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 50 (1948).
110. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 94, art. 2.
111. See T. DAvirr, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE NATURAL LAW. IN ORIGINS OF THE
NATURAL LAW TRADITION 26, 30-31 (Harding ed. 1954); Rommen, supra note 68, at 49; T.
AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 94, art. 2.
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. . .vicious customs and corrupt habits," people may err in their deduc-
tions of the secondary principles of the natural law.11" Homosexual activ-
ity, he points out, is not considered sinful among some people, although
St. Thomas explicity condemns it as "the unnatural crime."1 13
To be culpable for committing a wrong, one must know it is wrong
and choose to do it. We generally have neither the right nor the capacity
to judge the subjective, moral culpability of anyone. Various circum-
stances may diminish subjective culpability. But the presence or lack of
subjective culpability cannot change the objective character of the act.
Suppose you saw your friend, Freddy, with the hood of his car up, holding
a can of oil in one hand and a can of molasses in the other, and you
asked, "What are you doing?" Freddy answers, "Trying to make up my
mind, which one to put in my car, oil or molasses." If you were a real
friend of Freddy, what would you say? Would you say, "Freddy, how do
you feel about it?" No, what you would say is, "Freddy, you should do
good by your car. And the good is that which is in accord with the nature
of the thing. Oil is good for cars. Molasses isn't." "Yeah, but this is a
Chevy." "Freddy, it doesn't make any difference. Cars are all the same."
"Is that right? Well, who are you to tell me what to do with my car?" "If
you don't believe me, Freddy, look in the glove compartment at the man-
ufacturer's directions." (That is what the natural law and the Ten Com-
mandments are-a set of manufacturer's directions.) So Freddy looks at
the owner's manual and sees, on page 10, "Use oil-Do not use molasses."
Freddy says, "That's what it says, alright. But wait a minute. Whose car
is this? It's my car. (It's my body, etc.) They can't push me around. I'll do
what I want with my own car." So Freddy puts in the molasses. He is
sincere. He is liberated. He is pro-choice. And he is a pedestrian. Why?
Because, whether we are talking about automobiles, human beings or so-
ciety, the natural law is the story of how things work. We do no favor, for
example, to the person contemplating abortion when we encourage her to
decide according to her feelings. We cannot throw rocks at her, whatever
she decides. Her subjective disposition is for resolution between herself
and God. But we lie to her when we pretend that abortion can ever be
anything but an objective evil.
7. The relationship of the human law to the natural law
According to St. Thomas, the human law is the fourth type of law, in
addition to the eternal law, divine law and the natural law. Human law,
an integral part of God's plan, is designed to promote the common good
and help man attain his highest end of happiness with God. The human
law is derived from the natural law. It may be derived by conclusion, as
the law that one must not kill is a conclusion from the basic principle
that we should do harm to no man. It may also be derived by determina-
tion, as, for example, "[t]he law of nature has it that the evildoer should
112. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 94, art. 6.
113. Id. at Q. 94, art. 3, Q. 94, art. 6.
1989]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
be punished," but the human law decrees whether the punishment should
be "in this way or that way" by fine, imprisonment, or other penalty. "
Human law is framed "for the common good of all the citizens."'" "The
purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly but gradu-
ally."'16 Yet, even though the law should promote virtue, it should not
prescribe every virtue or forbid every vice lest by its unenforceability the
law be "despised" and "greater evils" result.117
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority
of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid
all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly
those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which
human society could not be maintained; thus human law prohibits mur-
der, theft and suchlike. 118
If human laws are just, they have the power of binding in conscience.
But if a human law "deflects from the law of nature," it is unjust "and is
no longer a law but a perversion of law.""' 9 St. Thomas explains that a
law may be unjust in two ways:
[Flirst, by being contrary to human good ... either in respect of the
end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws,
conducive, not to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or
vainglory; or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that
goes beyond the power committed to him; or in respect of the form, as
when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, although with
a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence rather than
laws; because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i.5), a law that is not
just, seems to be no law at all. Wherefore such laws do not bind in
conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for
which cause a man should even yield his right, according to Matth. v.
40, 41 ....
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Di-
vine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to any-
thing else contrary to the Divine law; and laws of this kind must nowise
be observed, because, as stated in Acts v. 29, we ought to obey God
rather than men."'0
On the issue of whether a law authorizing abortion would be unjust,
Aquinas, of course, knew nothing of the ovum and the process of fertiliza-
tion and gestation. His lack of modern scientific knowledge led him and
others at that time to conclude that ensoulment took place, not at con-
ception, but some time later, probably forty days for males and eighty
114. Id. at Q. 95, art. 2.
115. Id. at Q. 96, art. 1.
116. Id. at art. 2.
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at Q. 95, art. 2.
120. Id. at Q. 96, art. 4 (emphasis added).
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days for females. He concluded that abortion was not homicide until that
point, although he regarded abortion at every stage as a grave sin.121 St.
Thomas flatly denied that there can be any right intentionally to kill the
innocent. "Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent."' 22 There
is no doubt that Aquinas today would regard any law allowing abortion as
an unjust law. 2' If a physician were ordered to perform an abortion,
Aquinas' concept of the law which is unjust as contrary to divine good
would require that physician to disobey at all costs.'24 Aquinas places
human law in the framework of the plan of God who wants man to
achieve eternal happiness by choosing to love and obey Him:
Human law and, therefore, the state exist to promote the common good
and thereby to help man achieve his end of eternal happiness with God.
The state is not a necessary evil, nor is it a mere contrivance of the
majority or some mythical social compact. Rather it is good because it
is an integral part of God's plan. But the state is not an end in itself; it
is an instrument to help man achieve his end. St. Thomas, of course,
had not experienced the modern state, but his discussion of the human
law provides the basic principles to govern the state in any age. Aqui-
nas, therefore, directly contradicts the secularist and the positivist by
grounding his theory of law on the reality of God. Only in this way can
human law be limited. Otherwise, if God is not recognized, the state
becomes god. 125
Aquinas differs from the positivists and secularists also "in his view
of the nature of law. The positivist and the secularist reduce law to an act
of will by the one in control. It is true that there is an element of will in
the law (every law is a command), but, as St. Thomas affirms, something
more is needed. In order that 'what is commanded may have the nature
of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason.' This require-
ment proceeds from the fact that 'the whole community of the universe is
governed by Divine Reason.' The divine will cannot act separately from
121. See G. GRISEz, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES AND THE ARGUMENTS 154-55
(1970); J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 22-
26 (1970); Gerber, When is the Human Soul Infused?, 22 LAVAL THEOLOGIQUE ET
PHILOSOPHIQUE 234, 236 (1966); T. AQUINAS, S.T., III, Q. 68, art. 2; Heany, Aquinas and The
Humanity of the Conceptus, 15 HUMAN LIFE REV. 63 (1989); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3083 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
122. T. AQUINAS, S.T., II, Q. 64, art. 6.
123. As Pope John Paul II said at the Capitol Mall in Washington, D.C., on October 7,
1979, "no one ever has the authority to destroy unborn life." 18 ORIGINS 277 (Oct. 18, 1979).
124. Catholic teaching on the natural law forbids all direct abortions even those
sought to save the life of the mother. See Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modern World, no. 51; Declaration on Procured Abortion, (Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1974). This conclusion does not apply to procedures-such as
the removal of an ectopic pregnancy or a cancerous uterus-which do not directly destroy
the unborn child, which seek to preserve the child if possible, and which result in the death
of the child only as an unintended consequence of an independently justified operation. See
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities (National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, 1971).
125. C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION 34 (1979).
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the divine reason because 'God cannot be at variance with himself.12
The essence of law therefore pertains to reason. This is true of the natu-
ral law and human law as well as the eternal law and revelation.' 27
St. Thomas wrote in the Catholic tradition,'128 in which the teaching
authority of the Church includes the mission to declare the meaning of
the natural moral law in its applications. 129 St. Thomas also firmly ac-
cepted the teaching authority of the Church."s0
The acceptance or non-acceptance of the teaching authority of the
Pope as the Vicar of Christ and visible arbiter of the meaning of the nat-
ural law is probably the most important difference between the Catholic
approach and the approaches of other Christians to the natural law.
E. The Functions of the Natural Law
1. The constructive function
The natural law has two functions with respect to human law, which
might be called the "constructive" and the "critical." In its "construc-
tive" role, natural law serves as a guide for the enactment of laws to pro-
mote the common good. Natural law principles relating to economic,
social and political justice ought to be a familiar part of public discussion
on such issues as the family, employment relations and the prevention of
racial and other discriminations. For example, the harmful effects of per-
missive divorce, especially on the children of the marriage, are widely
noted. 31 Legislators should therefore consider restrictions on divorce so
as to strengthen the family as a divinely ordained natural society entitled
to the protection of the State.
This "constructive" role of the natural law includes Aquinas' limita-
tion that the human law should not try to enforce every virtue or prohibit
every vice. The natural law in this respect is a prescription for limited
government. The "constructive" function of the natural law is at least as
important as the "critical." In that "constructive" mode, the natural law
argument can make a significant contribution as a guide for how things
126. H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 51 (1948).
127. C. RICE, supra note 125, at 34-35.
128. Ambrosetti, The Spirit and Method of Christian Natural Law, 16 AM. J. JURIS-
PRUDENCE 290 (1971).
129. The teaching Church, consisting of the Pope and the bishops in union with him
(Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Nos. 22-25; Dogmatic Con-
stitution on Divine Revelation, No. 10), has repeatedly affirmed its prerogative to define the
moral norms of the natural law. See Pope John Paul II, Discourse to the International Con-
gress of Moral Theology April 10, 1986; Instruction on Procured Abortion (Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith) (1974).
130. "Therefore," he wrote, "no one who assents to the opinion of any teacher in op-
position to the manifest testimony of Scripture or in opposition to what is officially held in
accordance with the authority of the Church can be excused from the vice of being in error."
AQUINAS, QUAESTIONES QUODLIBETALES III, Q. 4, art. 2 (trans. A. Freddoso, Univ. of Notre
Dame, unpublished).
131. See Wallerstein, Children After Divorce: Wounds That Don't Heal, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Jan. 22, 1989, at 18.
[Vol. 24
NATURAL LAW
really ought to work according to the manufacturer's directions.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that natural law "pre-
tends to be some sort of magic formula that furnishes handy answers for
whatever practical legal questions may arise."' 32 Rather, in its "construc-
tive" function the natural law provides, not a cookbook series of recipes
but a reasonable guide to principles and general objectives. In the Catho-
lic tradition, further specification of those principles and objectives is
provided by the teaching Church, for example, on the "family wage,"
bioethics, in vitro fertilization, etc.'33
2. The critical function
The second function of the natural law is the critical function. In
that critical function, the natural law, unlike positivism, provides a reason
to draw a line and criticize an action of the state as unjust and even void.
That is why Rosa Parks was right when she refused to step to the back of
the bus in Montgomery, Alabama, on December 1, 1955.134 When the Na-
zis moved against the Jews, German lawyers were "disarmed," in Rad-
bruch's phrase, by "positivism." 135 It is interesting to speculate as to what
might have been had the German legal profession responded to the early
Nazi injustices with firm and principled denunciation.
The natural law principles advanced by George Mason, Blackstone,
Aquinas and others are supra-constitutional. The question is not whether
unconstitutional law-making power is assumed by a dictator, by a Su-
preme Court as constitutional interpreter, by a Congress, or by a majority
of the people. The issue is whether there is a higher law which sets
bounds to what the legal system, however it is structured, can do even
through constitutional provisions. The natural law argument can serve, in
the legislative process and the media, to forestall the enactment of unjust
laws or constitutional amendments.
The first reaction to the assertion of a claimed right to kill innocent
human beings should be to say that the recognition of such a right would
be unjust as well as a violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution. Roe v. Wade, however, in effect established the right to
kill as a constitutional right. Assuming that the Supreme Court is correct
in its claim that its decisions are the supreme law of the land,13 6 the issue
remains whether the Constitution itself is subject to a higher law. If a
constitutional amendment, for example, were adopted which required the
confiscation without trial of the property of members of a particular race,
would it be a valid law? A natural law adherent should respond in the
negative:
132, T. DAvIrr, supra note 111, at 45.
133. See Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, No. 19 (1981); Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, INSTRUCTiON ON BioEmics (1987).
134. J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZL: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-55, at 61-73
(1987).
135. For further discussion, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
136. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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A law on citizenship in connection with the so-called Nuremberg anti-
Semitic legislation of 1935 declared that German citizens of Jewish ori-
gin who lived at that time outside the country or in the future fled or
emigrated would automatically lose their German citizenship and their
property would be forfeited to the State. After the war many claimed
the restoration of property thus illegitimately confiscated. The court
recognized these claims and said: "These laws of confiscation, though
clothed in the formal rules of the legality of a law, cannot be considered
as a genuine Rechts-norm as to content . . . . This is an extremely
grave violation of the suprapositive principle of equality before the
law as well as of the suprapositive guarantee of property (Art. 153 Wei-
mar Const.)"' l 7
The natural law, however, is not a hunting license empowering judges
to impose their own morality to invalidate legislative decisions in genu-
inely debatable cases. Natural law theory would be especially limited in
this respect in the United States where the Constitution itself incorpo-
rates some basic natural law principles, e.g., due process and equal pro-
tection, under which laws contrary to them could be violative of the
supreme enacted law so that there would be no need for recourse to a
supra-constitutional higher law. Roe v. Wade, for example, is wrong first,
and sufficiently in legal terms, because it is a misinterpretation of the
fourteenth amendment. One case, however, in which a supra-constitu-
tional invocation of the natural law might have been arguably appropriate
is Brown v. Board of Education.3 8 There is evidence to support the con-
clusion that the fourteenth amendment was intended to allow officially
segregated public schools. 39 If one accepted that conclusion and also
found that public education today is sufficiently similar to that of 1868 to
be governed by the intent of the fourteenth amendment on the subject,
one could still argue that officially imposed racial segregation in schools
(or elsewhere) is void because it is inherently unjust to an "intolerable
degree," so as to violate the supra-constitutional standard of the natural
law. A human law, according to Aquinas, may be unjust as "contrary to
human good" when "burdens are imposed unequally on the commu-
nity."I" A similar approach could have been appropriate in the Dred
Scott case,' 4 ' in which the Supreme Court held that freed slaves and their
free descendants could not be citizens and said that slaves were property
rather than persons. Even if the Court there correctly interpreted the
technical intent of the Constitution, the decision is insupportable because
it attempts to break the inseparable connection that must exist, in any
free and just society, between humanity and personhood. Although the
Constitution is "the supreme law of the land," as a human law, it must
137. Rommen, supra note 68, at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting 16 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DEs BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZWILSACHEN 94 (1951)).
138. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139. See, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1955).
140. T. AQUINAS, S.T., I, II, Q. 96, art. 4.
141. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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itself be subject to the higher law. If a constitutional amendment were
adopted to require the disenfranchisement of persons of a certain race or
religion, there would seem little doubt that a judge would have the right
and the duty to declare the amendment itself unlawful and void. Never-
theless, this responsibility offers no warrant for "non-interpretive" judges
to roam at large over the constitutional landscape, acting as a "continuing
constitutional convention" in disregard of the constitutional text and the
evident intent of its framers. 142 Only rarely would a judge be entitled or
obliged to rely on supra-constitutional principles to refuse to uphold or
enforce an enacted law. As the German courts indicated after World War
II, judges should take this step only when the conflict between the law or
precedent and justice is "intolerable" or "unendurable." Such a conflict
could occur in the context of Roe v. Wade, since that ruling authorizes
the execution of a certainly innocent human being.143 Unfortunately, how-
ever, to analyze the options open to a judge in a case involving supra-
constitutional standards would require a separate article or book and
would be beyond the limited scope of this article.
A wider recognition of the natural law as part of the law of God
would serve as an incentive to the enactment of just laws as well as a
brake on the enactment of unjust ones. However, arguments based on the
natural law and the divine law will have little effect in a society that rec-
ognizes neither. It is not enough to argue the natural law case in academic
terms. A restoration of societal respect for that law and for the divine
law-a conversion-is needed before the natural law case will prevail in
the public arena. We do appear to be in the early stages of a reaction to
the positivistic jurisprudence which has deprived innocent life of any
principled protection against extinction. This reaction, however, is less
evident in the law schools than it is on the streets. One indication is the
expansion of the abortion rescue movement. More than 30,000 persons
have submitted to arrest in the past year as a result of their participation
in non-violent efforts to close abortuaries and thereby to save the unborn
children scheduled for abortion.144 The movement originated primarily as
an initiative of Evangelical and other Bible Christians. It has since in-
cluded large numbers of Catholics and others. Although the prudential
justifications for the rescue movement are debatable,'45 it is founded in
explicit reliance on the natural law as an aspect of the law of God. "I am
willing to be arrested for breaking a law," said one rescue participant,
"because I'm obeying a higher law, the law of God. We are saving human
lives. 1 4 6 And Roman Catholic Bishop Austin Vaughan justified his in-
142. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 2 (1977).
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volvement in rescues on the ground that, "The things that are decided by
governments are not always right. We can't go along, passively accepting
them .... The biggest threat to our country, faced with this, is compla-
cency and toleration. The longer you live with something bad along side
of you, you get used to it. I don't mean you accept it, but you no longer
get excited. We can't afford to have that happen. That's an enormous
disaster. Not just for the babies who are killed, not just for the people
doing to (sic) killing, it's an enormous disaster for all of us. Our standards
of what is important and vital wind up being eroded more and more as
times goes on.'1147
CONCLUSION
Every state has to have a God, an ultimate authority. It is increas-
ingly obvious that the root issue posed by contemporary legal philosophy
is religious: Who is God, the real One or the State? "Law, we must re-
member," said Rev. Rousas J. Rushdoony, "is a form of total war; ..
The modern state, by asserting its sovereignty, affirms that all things are
under its jurisdiction, and it must therefore, like God, control all
things."1 8 The main reason why so much has gone wrong with the law in
the twentieth century is the reason given by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn for
the consequences of Soviet Communism:
Over half a century ago, while I was still a child, I recall hearing a
number of older people offer the following explanation for the great di-
sasters that had befallen Russia: "Men have forgotten God; that's why
all this has happened."
* . . And if I were called upon to identify the principal trait of the
entire twentieth century, here too, I would be unable to find anything
more precise and pithy than to repeat once again: Men have forgotten
God." 
9
It should give us pause when we reflect that, in numbers involved
and in the degree of impact on the victim, legalized abortion is a worse
evil than was slavery. God is merciful. But He is also just. We could with
profit reflect on the remarks of George Mason, in the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787, arguing against the continuation of the slave trade.50
"Every master of slaves," said Mason, "is born a petty tyrant. They bring
the judgment of Heaven upon a country. As nations can not be rewarded
or punished in the next world they must be in this. By an inevitable chain
of causes and effects providence punishes national sins, by national
calamities."' 5'
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Law students, unfortunately, are presented jurisprudential options
mainly within the parameters of the Enlightenment, positivist view. They
ought at least to have the opportunity to consider all the options, includ-
ing the arguments for acceptance of "the laws of nature and of nature's
God." This is so because the prevailing American legal theory is at a dead
end. In its concept of law as merely an exercise of will and in its func-
tional definition of personhood, it offers no prospect for restoration of the
role of the law as guarantor of the inviolable rights of the innocent. It is
hopeless because it has forgotten its roots and the Lawgiver. But there is
a solution. It is simple. "What Moses brought down from Mount Sinai,"
said Ted Koppel at the 1987 Duke University commencement, "were not
the Ten Suggestions; they are Commandments. Are, not were. '152
(1975). The pertinence of Mason's observation is undiminished by the possibility that he
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